Secondary Obligors and the Restatement Third of Suretyship and Guaranty:  For Love or Money by Lewis, Brett E.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 3
The Seventh Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture
Article 6
11-1-1997
Secondary Obligors and the Restatement Third of
Suretyship and Guaranty: For Love or Money
Brett E. Lewis
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Brett E. Lewis, Secondary Obligors and the Restatement Third of Suretyship and Guaranty: For Love or Money, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 861
(1997).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol63/iss3/6
NOTES
SECONDARY OBLIGORS AND THE RESTATEMENT
THIRD OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY: FOR
LOVE OR MONEY
INTRODUCTION
The risky nature of the secondary obligation was well
documented even in biblical times.1 It was written that,
"[certain calamity comes to him who is surety for a stranger,
but he who hates, suretyship is secure.' The Bible warned
against making a thoughtless promise to become a secondary
obligor.' Despite such caveats, people pledged first their bod-
ies4 and then their money,' to answer for the obligations of
others. Thousands of years after Proverbs was written, an
1 THE NEw ENGLISH BIBLE WITH THE APOCRYPHA 676 (Samuel Sandmel, et a]
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976). Commentary to the Book explains that Proverbs,
'represents the results of a search for divinely sustained order in the lessons de-
rived from human experience." I&L
2 PROVERBS 11:15; see also WnLIM V. HAGENDORN, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP
AND GUARANTY 1 (1938) (citing Proverbs for Israelite characterizations of the sec-
ondary obligor, which were incorporated into scripture).
' PROVERBS 17:18 ("A man is without sense who gives a guarantee and sur-
renders himself to another as surety.").
' HAGENDORN, supra note 2, at 1 ('The first surety was the hostage, who,
with his body impounded, answered with his life for the observance by his family
or tribe of the promises exacted by their conqueror.).
" HAGENDORN, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the secondary obligors liability
was first translated into money during the reign of Henry HI, 1154-1189 (citing
OLI WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 260 (1881)).
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authority on suretyship noted that, "[m]isplaced confidence has
frequently pauperized the surety who unwittingly reposed his
trust in a stranger he saw as his friend."6
The risk that the principal obligor will not perform is a
risk which many uncompensated secondary obligors7 have
been willing to take. However, there is a more pernicious risk
facing those inclined to assume gratuitous secondary obliga-
tions-this being that creditors8 will take actions which inter-
fere with their right to be made whole by the principal obligor
or otherwise increase the cost of their performance.
There are several ways in which the creditor may increase
the cost of performance to the uncompensated secondary obli-
gor.9 Any modification of an underlying obligation carries the
risk of worsening the principal obligor's ability to perform and,
correspondingly, increasing the cost of a secondary obligor's
performance. 0 The possibility that the obligee could impose
such costs upon the uncompensated secondary obligor has tra-
ditionally been seen as unfair." Professor Neil B. Cohen, Re-
porter for The Restatement Third of the Law of Suretyship and
Guaranty ("Restatement"),'2 explained that, "[bly taking such
actions, the obligee would essentially be tampering with the
6 HAGENDORN, supra note 2, at 1-2.
' As used in this Note, the term "uncompensated secondary obligor" denotes
secondary obligors who are not in the business of entering into secondary obliga-
tions, receive no business benefit for entering into the secondary obligation, and
are not otherwise induced to enter into the secondary obligation by separate con-
sideration that directly benefits the secondary obligor. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 49(2)(a)(i) (1995) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP]. Uncompensated or gratuitous secondary obligors are
"consumers" who assume the secondary obligation out of motives of friendship and
not for pecuniary benefit.
' The term "creditor" as used in this Note is synonymous with "obligee" and
"commercial lender."
' Neil B. Cohen, Striking The Balance: The Evolving Nature Of Suretyship De-
fenses, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1032 (1993); see infra Part I.B.
1 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1032 (modifications include releases, extensions,
impairments of collateral, and other impairments of recourse); see infra Part I.B.
" See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1033 ("The doctrines collectively known as 'sure-
tyship defenses' have developed to prevent the obligee from unfairly imposing such
costs on the secondary obligor.").
12 RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7.
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delicate equilibrium of the suretyship transaction, maintaining
the benefit of the secondary obligation while harming the posi-
tion of the secondary obligor."'
The doctrines, collectively known as "suretyship defenses,"
were developed to prevent creditors from tampering with that
equilibrium.'4 The traditional model of suretyship defenses
brought about an automatic, complete discharge of the second-
ary obligation upon any modification of the underlying obliga-
tion by the creditor without the secondary obligor's express
consent. While protecting the secondary obligor'6 from loss,
this model frustrated the purpose of the secondary obligation,
making it "a slim reed on which to rely."'7 Creditors chose not
to rely upon this "slim reed," but rather, resorted to the fre-
quent utilization of provisions waiving suretyship defenses.'"
Waiver allowed creditors to circumvent the application of sure-
tyship defenses. Thus, while seeming to offer broad protection
to uncompensated secondary obligors, the traditional model of
suretyship defenses, "brought about a regime in which second-
ary obligors typically have no protection whatsoever,"'9 as the
commercial lender regularly requires the secondary obligor to
waive all suretyship defenses as a condition precedent to the
extension of credit to the principal obligor.'0
" Cohen, supra note 9, at 1033 (stating that such actions can destroy the sec-
ondary obligor's rights to subrogation and restitution, "and the principal obligor's
duties to the secondary obligor.").
' Cohen, supra note 9, at 1033. Courts applied the doctrine of strictissimi juris
wherein '[a]ny alteration of the contract between the [principal obligor] and the
creditor without the consent of the [secondary obligor] was sufficient to discharge
him whether or not loss or prejudice to the [secondary obligor] resulted from such
change." HAGENDORN, supra note 2, at 2; see also i fra Part LB.
See infra Part I.B.
16 The term "secondary obligor' as used in this Note includes "sureties" and
"guarantors."
1 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042 ("MWlaivers are so heavily utilized in some
commercial contexts that it is rare to see a suretyship transaction in those con-
texts that does not contain a waiver of suretyship defenses.").
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043.
2o Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043 (C[O]bligees with sufficient market pow-
er-virtually all lenders-are unlikely to extend credit unless the secondary obligor
has not only entered into the secondary obligation but also waived all suretyship
defenses.').
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The Restatement perpetuates an imbalance between the
rights of creditors and uncompensated secondary obligors.
Although the Restatement adopts an equitable damages model
of suretyship defenses,2' those defenses will rarely, if ever,
provide any protection to uncompensated secondary obligors
because it also sanctions the indiscriminate utilization of provi-
sions waiving suretyship defenses.22 Thus, under the Restate-
ment, uncompensated secondary obligors will continue to lack
the protection of the law.
This Note contends that, as a matter of consumer protec-
tion, the law should extend an unwaivable protection to un-
compensated secondary obligors. It also recognizes that com-
pensated secondary obligors do not require similarly tender
treatment. Part I of this Note explores how the treatment of
secondary obligors in the law came to depend upon the nature
of the inducement for assuming the secondary obligation, and
describes the operation of the traditional model of suretyship
defenses. This Part also discusses the doctrine of waiver, and
the role that this doctrine had in mitigating the harshness of
the traditional suretyship defenses. Part II sets forth the Re-
statement model of suretyship defenses, and then examines
the operation of the Restatement's proposed defenses through a
series of examples. This Part also explains the Restatement
view on waiver of suretyship defenses. Part III criticizes the
Restatement model of suretyship defenses for advocating a
doctrine of permissive waiver and investigates the unconscio-
nability of waiver as applied to the gratuitous secondary
obligor's defenses. This Part also analyzes the effects of imple-
menting non-waivable defenses for uncompensated secondary
obligors, and responds to some potential critiques of a policy
which would enforce such defenses.
Finally, this Note concludes that, as a matter of consumer
protection, any application of the doctrine of waiver to uncom-
pensated secondary obligations should be prohibited as against
public policy. Under the law proposed by the Restatement, the
rights of uncompensated secondary obligors are not adequately
"1 See infra Part I.C.
22 See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 (consent may be ex-
press or implied, in terms which are general or specific, without regard to whether
the secondary obligor is gratuitous or compensated).
[Vol. 63: 861
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represented. However, in this proposal, the rights of gratuitous
secondary obligors are addressed, and an equilibrium between
the rights of obligees and uncompensated secondary obligors is
established.
I. SURETYSHmip DEFENSES
A. Compensated and Uncompensated Secondary Obligors
The law traditionally has been sympathetic toward second-
ary obligors because the uncompensated secondary obligor
receives no benefit from the underlying transaction.' The ad-
vent of the compensated secondary obligor, however, brought
about many modifications in the law of suretyship.' As courts
questioned the soundness of a policy which granted absolute
and complete discharge to all secondary obligors, the extent
to which suretyship defenses operated to grant discharge of the
secondary obligation came to depend upon whether the second-
ary obligor was compensated or uncompensatedY
Nearly 100 years ago, Arthur Stearns noted in his treatise
on suretyship law that, "the law has long drawn distinctions
between [compensated] and private [uncompensated] sure-
ties.' An appellate court from the First District of Illinois,
citing the Restatement of Security, recently noted that, "[ilt is
important to distinguish between compensated and other sure-
ties because the rules of suretyship, notably those relating to
23 RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49 cmt. b, at 213 ("The law
has often articulated a special solicitude for 'uncompensated' or 'gratuitous' sure-
ties."). See also 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAv OF CONIRACTS
§ 1212A, at 3488 (Samuel Williston & George J. Thompson eds., rev. ed. 1936);
HAGENDORN, supra note 2, at 2.
24 See WILLSTON, supra note 23, at 3487.
See WILLISTON, supra note 23, at 3487-88.
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49 Reporters Note, at 217
(stating that in the Restatement of Security 'uncompensated sureties' were held
to be automatically discharged by any extension or modification of the underlying
obligation, while 'compensated sureties' were only discharged to the extent that the
extension or modification caused a loss to the secondary obligor.); see also
HAGENDOPN, supra note 2, at 2; WILLISTON, supra note 23, at 3487-88.
2 ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 447 (1903); Cf JAMES L
ELDER, STEARNS ON SURETYSHIP § 5.1 (5th ed. 1951) ("It is not surprising to find
different judicial and legislative treatment of the corporate compensated surety, in
view of the contrasting motive and method of conducting its business.).
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the defenses of the surety, are not in all respects alike for the
two classes."' However, the Restatement of Security defined
compensated secondary obligor narrowly, as only those second-
ary obligors who, "engaged in the business of executing surety
contracts."29 Professor Gary Monserud recently criticized this
definition of compensated secondary obligors, declaring that,
"the .[Restatement of Security's] category of compensated sure-
ties is too limited," for it includes only sophisticated corporate
surety companies, "who require and rely upon actuarial calcu-
lations, and it excludes interested [secondary obligors] who
sign as [secondary obligors] in the expectation of a monetary
benefit."0
In drawing a distinction between compensated and uncom-
pensated secondary obligors, the 1995 Restatement essentially
adopts Professor Monserud's definition of the term "compensat-
ed secondary obligor."3' This categorization makes sense."2
" Chandler v. Maxwell Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 740, 752 (1996)
(citing RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmt. i, 234 (1941)) (emphasis added). The
Restatement of Security contained the first promulgation of the law of suretyship
and guarantee by the American Law Institute.
29 RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmt. i, 233-34 (1941).
"0 Gary L. Monserud, Interested Sureties and the Restatement of Suretyship: An
Argument Against Tender Treatment, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 247, 255 (1992) (noting
that before the 1941 Restatement, "courts generally treated interested [secondary
obligors] the way compensated [secondary obligors] are treated under the rules in
[that] Restatement."). Thus, Professor Monserud signified that the 1941
Restatement's choice to limit the scope of compensated secondary obligors to surety
companies was a decision to break with the more common interpretation-that
where the inducement for assuming the secondary obligation was the prospect of
receiving a benefit, the secondary obligor was considered to be compensated, and
thus, subject to a more stringent, less tender set of suretyship defenses.
31 RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49(2)(a)(i), and Reporter's
Note, at 217 (adopting Professor Monserud's article as support for the, "less tender
treatment of 'interested [secondary obligors].").
"2 This Note also adopts Professor Monserud's definition of "compensated sec-
ondary obliger." The Restatement defines compensated secondary obligors as those
secondary obligors who are "in the business of entering into secondary obligations,
received a business benefit for entering into the secondary obligation," or are oth-
erwise "induced to enter into the secondary obligation by separate consideration
that directly benefits the secondary obligor." RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra
note 7, § 49(2)(a)(i). Corporate secondary obligors, such as surety companies, are
"in the business of entering into secondary obligations." RESTATEMENT OF SURETY-
SHIP, supra note 7, at 213. The commentary to the Restatement defines "business
benefit" as "a benefit flowing from enhancing the credit of a customer or supplier,
or of an enterprise of which the secondary obligor is an owner or officer." RE-
STATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, at 214. And, "consideration that directly
benefits the secondary obligor," must be "the inducement for the secondary obligor
[Vol. 63: 861
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Business persons who guarantee loans for their own compa-
nies, and individuals who are induced to assume secondary
obligations by the promise of pecuniary enrichment stand to
benefit from the creation of the underlying obligation. Just as
the surety company is compensated for assuming the second-
ary obligation, so too are the business person and the private
individual who are induced by the prospect of receiving a bene-
fit.
In addition to entering into suretyship transactions for a
benefit,' compensated secondary obligors often structure
their own contracts.' Their business often demands familiari-
ty with the law of suretyship, and they "make an elaborate in-
vestigation of... risk before undertaking liability.1' In con-
trast, Stearns wrote of uncompensated secondary obligors:
The great field of special construction in favor of the surety arises
from the fact that he is an accommodation party and generally takes
no part in the writing of the contract... he gives the business no
attention and relies for his protection on the rules of strict construc-
tion being applied in his favor, if any doubt arises as to the meaning
of his contract."
to enter into the secondary obligation; otherwise, a sophisticated obligee would
simply give the secondary obligor a nominal sum (or insist the principal obligor do
so) in consideration of the secondary obligation, thereby disadvantaging a Eecond-
ary obligor actually motivated by friendship or familial devotion." RESTATElz2r OF
SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, at 214.
' Monserud, supra note 30, at 252 (defining an "interested" or "compensated"
secondary obligor as "one who has a pecuniary interest in the underlying contract
for which he is surety," or who has a business reason for entering into the second-
ary obligation). The class of secondary obligors which Professor Monserud referred
to as 'interested sureties" are referred to in this Note as "compensated secondary
obligors." Corporate sureties unquestionably are compensated. See STEARNS, supra
note 27, at 444 ("Corporate suretyship is a business transaction for profit); sez
also WILISTON, supra note 23, § 1212A, at 3488 ( Tlhe corporate surety under-
takes the obligation as a business and exacts therefor a profitable premium.").
WILLISTON, supra note 23, at 3488. (observing that 'the compensated corpo-
rate surety employs a staff of experts and attorneys who prepare carefully drawn
agreements."); STEARNS, supra note 27, at 445 ("LIMhe corporate surety... usually
prepares its own contracts, carefully and distinctly defining its rights and liabili-
ties... and also setting out in the bond itself the rights and privileges which the
law affords to private sureties....").
WILUSTON, supra note 23, at 3488.
STEARNS, supra note 27, at 450.
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Thus, consumers who have assumed uncompensated secondary
obligations depend upon the law to strike down unjust terms
and to protect them against unfairness.
While compensated secondary obligors are motivated by
the expectation of receiving a benefit," uncompensated sec-
ondary obligors receive no benefit from assuming the second-
ary obligation. 9 Rather, they are induced by relationships40
and motivated by bonds of family and friendship to assume
secondary obligations,4' as when parents guaranty a student
loan for their child. And unlike many compensated secondary
obligors, they do not prepare their own contracts,42 they usu-
ally do not contemplate elements of risk,43 and they cannot
offset risk either in part or over numerous transactions."
Furthermore, gratuitous secondary obligors take little time to
decipher the meaning of technical contractual provisions."5
For these reasons, a distinction often has been drawn between
the rules applied to compensated and uncompensated second-
ary obligors. 6 The courts, "have recognized that the [compen-
See STEARNS, supra note 27, at 450.
See STEARNS, supra note 27.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1030 ("In these cases, the secondary obligor receives
no benefit from the transaction other than the satisfaction of having made possible
the principal obligor's obtaining credit that otherwise would have been unavail-
able."); WILLISTON, supra note 23, § 1212A (stating that private secondary obligors
generally receive no consideration).
' See ELDER, supra note 27, at 89 (stating that uncompensated secondary
obligors assume legal obligations from "motives of friendliness.").
41 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1029-30 (discussing motivation for undertaking sec-
ondary obligation and professing that "[s]ometimes the secondary obligor has fa-
milial ties to the principal obligor or is bound to the principal obligor by ties of
friendship."); WILLISTON, supra note 23, at 3488 (stating that the uncompensated
secondary obligor "usually undertakes the [secondary] obligation as a personal
favor for his friend.").
4 ELDER, supra note 27, at 89 (stating that an uncompensated secondary obli-
gor becomes "a party to a contract prepared and drawn by another.").
' See WILLISTON, supra note 23, at 3488 (stating that the uncompensated
secondary obligor "usually undertakes the [secondary] obligation as a favor for his
friend, the principal [obligor], without investigation of or particular regard for the
latter's financial condition.").
" All compensated secondary obligors are able to offset risk to some extent,
while surety companies can do so by incorporating risk into their premiums
charged. See ELDER, supra note 27, at 89 (contrasting private uncompensated sec-
ondary obligors with corporate secondary obligors who assume classified risks in
large numbers).
' STEARNS, supra note 27, at 450.
48 See, e.g., RESTATEmENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49, at 217 (drawing
(Vol. 63:861
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sated] corporate [secondary obligor] is in a better position to
protect itself against improper conduct on the part of the prin-
cipal and obligee," than is the uncompensated secondary obli-
gor."
B. Traditional Suretyship Defenses
The traditional model of suretyship defenses granted the
secondary obligor an automatic, complete discharge of the
obligation to perform if the creditor took any action which
changed the nature of the underlying obligation."3 The tradi-
tional rule included within its aibit modifications which were
beneficial to the principal obligor, 9 and thus reduced the like-
a distinction between the burden of persuasion for compensated and uncompensat-
ed secondary obligors with respect to impairment of recourse, and recognizing that
"a secondary obligor who enters into the secondary obligation as its business or for
separate consideration or other business benefit is likely to be in a better position
to demonstrate loss than is a secondary obligor who has none of these attributes
of 'professionalism."); RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, at 217 (stating
that in the Restatement of Security, "'uncompensated sureties' were held to be
automatically discharged by any extension or modification of the underlying obliga-
tion, while 'compensated sureties' were only discharged to the extent that the
extension or modification caused a loss to the secondary obligor.); Vinston Corp.
v. Continental Cas. Co., 508 F.2d 1298, 1302 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that most
jurisdictions differentiate between compensated and uncompensated secondary
obligors for the purpose of determining contractual liability); Barber County Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Walker, Civ. No. 87-2447-0, 1988 WL 139503, 2 (D. Kan. 1988)
(stating that Kansas courts have been very protective of uncompensated sureties).
,7 WILSTON, supra note 23, at 3493. There is a well established line of cases,
which considers to be compensated, secondary obligors who affirmatively seek a
business benefit. Monserud, supra note 30, at 302 (citing Gellis v. Gellis & Co.,
322 A.2d 287 (Del. Ch. 1974)).
' Cohen, supra note 9, at 1037 ("Under this model, the secondary obligor is
completely discharged from the secondary obligation if the obligee has impaired
the secondary obligor's recourse against the principal obligor, whether or not the
impairment of recourse caused (or might cause) the secondary obliger any los.
(citing Driscoll v. Winters, 54 P. 387, 388 (Cal. 1898) (determining that a second-
ary obliger for a purchaser of milk was discharged when the quantity to be pur-
chased was decreased); and Board of Comm'rs. v. Greenleaf, 83 N.W. 157, 158
(Minn. 1900) (holding that a reduction of the interest rate from 317 to 251 dis-
charged an uncompensated secondary obliger); and Katz v. Leblang, 277 N.Y.S.
850, 853, 243 A.D. 421 (App. Div. 1935) (holding that a reduction in lease rent
discharged a secondary obliger for a tepant))). STEARNS, supra note 27, at 98
("Any change in the terms of the principal contract which obliges the debtor to do
something which he was not before bound to do will discharge the surety or guar-
antor.").
" The term "principal obligor" as used in this Note is synonymous with the
term 'debtor.'
199'7]
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
lihood that the secondary obligor would ever have to per-
form.5 ° For example, while reducing the size of payments on a
lease agreement or lowering the interest rate on a loan would
benefit the secondary obligor, the creditor would bring brought
about automatic unconditional discharge of the entire second-
ary obligation by taking such actions. 1 Though clearly unfair
to creditors, such results were justified on the grounds that
any interference with the underlying contract was interference
to which the secondary obligor did not consent. 2
Changes in the original contract were seen to create new
risks that the subject of the guaranty would not be performed
by the principal obligor." The traditional model of suretyship
defenses treated the creditor's refraining from modification of
the underlying contractual obligation as a condition precedent
to the duty of the secondary obligor to perform the suretyship
obligation.' 4 Application of the traditional suretyship defenses
often would result in windfalls for the secondary obligor. 5
C. Waiver of Suretyship Defenses
The harsh consequences which flowed from modification of
the underlying obligation led to the proliferation of waiver
clauses in suretyship transactions,56 as creditors sought to
protect themselves against inequitable loss. By extending cred-
it only where secondary obligors had waived their suretyship
'0 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1037.
" Cohen, supra note 9, at 1037.
52 STEARNS, supra note 27, at 99. Steams explained the traditional rationale
for such a policy.
The contract as changed is not the same contract guaranteed by the
promisor. The original contract has been put an end to and a new one
substituted. The guarantor has never agreed to stand good for the latter,
and suretyship cannot be imposed without the express consent of the
promisor, and his execution of the original contract will not carry by
implication any liability upon a substituted contract, although the latter
is similar to the first. STEARNS, supra note 27, at 99.
' STEARNS, supra note 27, at 99 ("The addition of new burdens upon the prin-
cipal may be the cause of his failure to perform any part of his contract.").
5, Cohen, supra note 9, at 1047.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1041.
56 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042 ("The existence of a waiver doctrine, and its
frequent utilization, should come as no surprise. The dire consequences that flow
to the obligee. . . in the event of an impairment of recourse make a secondary
obligation a slim reed on which to rely.").
[Vol. 63: 861
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defenses, creditors were able to circumvent the protections
which had arisen to safeguard secondary obligors against
harmful contractual modifications.' Although waiver protect-
ed creditors from the harsh consequences of traditional surety-
ship defenses, it returned uncompensated secondary obligors to
a state of relative helplessness.' The routine utilization of
waiver and consent provisions effected a virtual return in the
state of the law to the time before suretyship defenses exist-
ed. 9 The rights of creditors and uncompensated secondary
obligors had once again swung out of balance, this time favor-
ing creditors.
II. THE RESTATEMENT MODEL OF SURETYSHIP DEFENSES
A. An Overview
The Restatement has taken quite a different approach to
discharge of the secondary obligations' by advocating dis-
charge only to the extent that the creditor's actions would
cause loss to the secondary obligor.6' This approach is consis-
tent with a modern damages model of suretyship defenses m
" See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043 (explaining how traditional models of sure-
tyship defenses, which led to the frequent utilization of the waiver doctrine 'have
brought about a regime in which secondary obligors typically have no protection
whatsoever.").
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043 ("(lit is not much of an exaggeration to say
that, at least in certain contexts, suretyship defenses essentially do not exist.).
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §§ 39-42 ("[1]f the secondary
obligor is not discharged from its unperformed duties pursuant to the secondary
obligation... the secondary obligor is discharged from those duties to the ex-
tent... that the release of a duty to pay money ... would otherwise cause the
secondary obliger a loss .. ").
6 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1040 (The secondary obliger always "breaks even7 in
the sense that remedy for releases, extensions, or impairments of collateral 'puts
the secondary obliger back into the same economic position it would have been in
had the act never taken place.").
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1047-1048. Professor Cohen asserted that:
[Miodern doctrines ... treat the acts of the obliges that impair the sec-
ondary obligor's recourse as breaches of the duty to refrain from upset-
ting the equilibrium of the secondary obliger's position. As in the case of
breaches of duty in both contract and tort, the obligee is responsible for
the cost of the harm caused by the bad act, but no more. Thus, if the
act constituting an impairment of recourse causes the secondary obliger
no harm, the secondary obliger is entitled to no relieE
1997]
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and makes sense both as an evolution and innovation of sure-
tyship law.' Creditors are free to exercise their judgment in
granting releases or extensions and otherwise modifying un-
derlying obligations; however, they are liable for any loss
which is caused to a secondary obligor as a result of their
acts."
For example, assume that a creditor granted a principal
obligor an extension of time (during which performance was
set to be due under the terms of the original contract), banking
on the fact that an extension would improve the creditor's
chances of receiving performance from the principal obligor. If
the principal obligor's ability to perform subsequently deterio-
rated, suretyship defenses under the Restatement would place
this loss upon the creditor,' thus allowing the secondary obli-
gor to escape the loss caused by the creditor's modification of
the underlying obligation.
Under the Restatement model, the secondary obligor re-
mains obligated to perform to the extent that the principal
obligor could not have at the time when performance became
due under the terms of the original contract.66 For example,
assume that a principal obligor could have paid $500 of a
$1000 obligation on the date set in an original contract. Fol-
lowing an extension of time granted by a creditor, the principal
obligor's ability to perform deteriorated to the point where she
could pay only $100. The secondary obligor would be dis-
charged to the extent of the loss caused by the extension
(which is a modification of the terms of the underlying obliga-
tion). In this case, the secondary obligor would pay only the
$500 which the principal obligor could not pay on the date
when the original obligation was due; the principal obligor
Id.
See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1048 ("The Restatement proposes adoption of a
damages model of suretyship defenses for several reasons. Generally speaking, tho
damages model is consistent with the remedy theory articulated in the Uniform
Commercial Code that remedies should put the innocent party in as good a posi-
tion (but no better) as that party would have been in had the transgressor acted
consistently with its duty." (citing U.C.C. § 1-106 (1990))).
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §§ 39-42.
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §40 cmt. d, at 178 ("The second-
ary obligor is discharged from its duties pursuant to the secondary obligation to
the extent that it would otherwise suffer a loss because of the extension.").
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §§ 39-42.
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would pay the creditor the $100 it had left; and the creditor
would suffer a $400 loss." The secondary obligor can be dis-
charged completely only if the creditor's action completely
destroys the ability of a solvent principal obligor to perform.'
As this would be against the creditor's interest, it is unlikely
that a creditor would permit a principal obligor's ability to
perform so to deteriorate to the point of not being able to per-
form at all.69 Under the Restatement model of suretyship
defenses, the creditor is in the best position both to avoid risk
and spread loss.7" It follows that when the secondary obligor
is uncompensated, the creditor should suffer such loss as the
creditor induces.7' Yet, the Restatements position on waiver
of suretyship defenses is likely to ensure that creditors are al-
most uniformly immunized from loss.72
' The Restatement provides other illustrations of suretyship defenses in action,
such as:
D borrows $10,000 from C, payable on July 12. S agrees with C that, if
D does not repay the loan on its due date, S will repay the loan. On
July 11, C grants D, who is solvent, an extension of the due date of the
loan to October 31. On July 12, S seeks enforcement of D's duty to S to
repay the loan. S is denied relief because of the extension. On October
31, D is insolvent and, as a result, only $3,000 is recovered from D with
respect to the loan. S is discharged to the extent of the $7,000 loss
caused by the extension.
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §40 Ills. 3-4, at 179.
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §§ 39-42.
' Cohen, supra note 9, at 1040-41 ("After all, an obligee is not likely to re-
lease a principal obligor who has the wherewithal to perform .... To the extent
that a release of the principal obligor causes the secondary obligor a loss at all,
such a loss will result from the obligee's failure to squeeze every last nickel from
the principal obligor as consideration for the release.").
70 See infra parts lI.A-C.
71 See infra part II.
' The more equitable nature of the Restatement model of suretyship defenses,
alone, is unlikely to induce creditors to stop utilizing waiver provisions. Thus,
what Professor Cohen said about waiver of traditional suretyship defense3 will
likely remain true for suretyship defenses under the Restatement; 'that obligee3
with sufficient market power-virtually all lenders-are unlikely to extend credit
unless the secondary obligor has ... waived all suretyship defenses. Cohen, su-
pra note 9, at 1043.
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B. Suretyship Defenses in Action
An example of how the Restatement model of suretyship
defenses works will help to illuminate the advantages of such a
position over the traditional model of suretyship defenses.
Suppose that buyer wants to purchase a car, but that dealer
deems him to have insufficient credit on which to base financ-
ing. Dealer is willing to sell the car, however, if buyer's flanc~e
agrees to guarantee payment of buyer's obligation. Buyer's
flanc6e agrees to these terms, and buyer purchases the car.
Buyer makes monthly payments until he decides that he would
rather pursue his life-long dream of exotic bird-watching in
Venezuela. But before he goes, he negotiates a release from
any further obligation to make payments with dealer. In ex-
change for all of the cash that buyer has available at that mo-
ment, dealer releases him from any further obligation to make
payments.
Under the traditional model of suretyship defenses, release
of buyer would have released flanc6e from her obligation to
make payments. Under the Restatement view, however,
flancde's obligation would be relieved only to the extent that
dealer had caused buyer to be unable to perform (i.e. pay for
the car)."3 The effect of the Restatement model of suretyship
defenses is to put the secondary obligor [fianc6e] back "into the
same economic position she would have been in had the act
[release] never taken place."7
Whether dealer's actions caused buyer not to perform to
the fullest extent possible would require a factual determina-
tion. For example, if buyer was induced to quit his job, and/or
leave the country because of the release, then a court would
have to determine the extent to which the release caused him
not to perform. It is this induced nonperformance which causes
loss.
In a variation on this theme, if buyer did not ask for a
release, but simply flew off to Venezuela to pursue his dream,
fianc6e would be liable to dealer for making the remaining
payments on the car. What differentiates these situations is
that in the first case, the creditor's actions caused the principal
73 See RESTATEIdENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §§ 39-42.
" Cohen, supra note 9, at 1040.
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obligor not to perform, while in the latter, the principal obligor
stopped performing of his own volition.
Similarly, assume the same set of initial facts as before,
but this time buyer is fired from his job and cannot make pay-
ments. Dealer negotiates a release of buyer which leaves buyer
homeless and without a nickel in his pocket. Assume further
that buyer has no foreseeable prospects for employment. In
this case, dealer's actions would not have harmed fiancde.
There is no difference between what the principal obligor could
have paid and what the creditor extracted from the principal
obligor. Accordingly, the secondary obligor would be obligated
to make the remaining payments on the car.
C. Waiver of Suretyship Defenses Under the Restatement
The Restatement takes a liberal view of the contractual
doctrine of consent, or waiver,7 in its application to surety-
ship transactions. 6 The creditor may utilize, without restric-
tion, provisions waiving suretyship defenses. It makes no
difference, under existing law and practice as advocated by the
Restatement, whether the secondary obligor whose defenses
are to be waived is compensated or uncompensated. 5
Waiver can affect how much a secondary obligor has to
pay, 9 when she must perform,'0 how costly her performance
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. d, at 210.
70 The Restatement provision on waiver provides that:
The secondary obligation is not discharged... to the extent that, in the
contract creating the secondary obligation or otherwise, the secondary
obligor consents to acts that would otherwise be the basis of the dis-
charge, agrees that such discharges are unavailable to the secondary
obligor, or waives such discharges. Consent may be expres or implied
from the circumstances. Such consent, agreement, or waiver, if expre3s,
may be effectuated by specific language or by general language indicating
that the secondary obligor waives defenses based on suretyship. (empha-
sis added).
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48(1), at 208.
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48.
78 See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48.
See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. a, at 209 (con-
senting secondary obliger is not discharged from duty to perform where creditor
grants a release, extension, or otherwise impairs the underlying obligation which
results in deterioration of the principal obligor's ability to pay).
' See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 40(a), at 176. Where a
secondary obligor consents to waiver of its suretyship defenses, the time for perfor-
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will be,8 ' and whether she has to perform at all." Waiver of
suretyship defenses occurs when a secondary obligor consents
to actions by a creditor which would change the terms of the
underlying obligation between creditor and principal obligor.83
For example, waiver can take the form of a blanket consent to
release or extension of time for performance by the principal
obligor, "or consent[] to acts that would otherwise be the basis
of... discharge."'
"[Tihe secondary obligor is not discharged as a result of
loss caused by actions of the obligee to which [she] con-
sents."' In the following illustration, suretyship defenses
operate to discharge the secondary obligor of a $10,000 obliga-
tion:
mance of the duties of the principal obligor may be extended by the obligee. Thus,
the date on which the secondary obligor has contracted to have its obligation be-
come due is not necessarily the same as the date on which the secondary obligor
will be asked to perform.
81 See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 39 cmt. g, at 173 ("When
the underlying obligation is performance other than the payment of money, a
release of the principal obligor has an effect on the secondary obligor that is par-
ticularly difficult to quantify. First... the ability of a principal obligor to perform
a nonmonetary obligation is typically not susceptible of reliable determination.
Second . . . the cost of performance by the secondary obliger may be different
than it would have been for the principal obliger. Economies of scale and accumu-
lated expertise, for example, would make it likely that the cost of performance
would be lower for the principal obliger than for the secondary obliger . . . ."); see
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1041 (a secondary obliger would be liable for any unper-
formed portion of the underlying obligation and might be unable to recover fully
from a principal obliger, causing the secondary obliger to suffer loss).
82 See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 39(b), at 168 (absent con-
sent or waiver of suretyship defenses by the secondary obliger, and absent an
express "preservation of recourse" by the obligee of the rights of the secondary
obliger as against the principal obliger (RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note
7, § 38 cmt. b, at 166), the release of the principal obliger acts to release the
secondary obliger from its entire obligation). If the obligee "preserves the recourse"
of the secondary obliger as against the principal obliger, as provided for in § 38,
"the obligee's impairment of the secondary obliger's recourse generally will dis-
charge the secondary obliger [or secondary obliger [only] to the extent necessary
to prevent loss." Id. § 38 cmt. b, at 166. However, the secondary obliger who has
consented, in advance, to allowing an obligee to release a principal obligor, at his
or her discretion, without affecting the relationship between the secondary obligor
and the obligee, will remain obligated to perform to the full extent of the underly-
ing obligation. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48.
" RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48, at 208.
8 RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48, at 208.
8 RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §48 cmt. a, at 209.
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To induce C to lend D $10,000, S agrees to guarantee D's obligation
to repay the loan. As part of a settlement of an unrelated dispute, C
releases D, who is solvent, from liability with respect to the loan. C
then seeks repayment of the loan from S. The release of D's duty to
C also releases D's corresponding duty to S and, accordingly, would
reduce the amount S could recover from D from $10,000 to $0. The
difference between the cost of S's performance and the amount re-
coverable from D has increased from $0 to $10,000; therefore, S is
discharged to the extent of its full $10,000 duty.
However, had suretyship defenses been waived, the creditor's
actions would have caused the full burden of repaying the
obligation to fall upon the secondary obligor. This Note's varia-
tion on the example cited in the text and borrowed from the
Restatement illustrates what is most malignant about permis-
sive waiver-it allows creditors to frustrate the uncompensated
secondary obligor's expectation that the contract will be per-
formed in good faith, as structured, and not modified to the
creditor's benefit. Moreover, it fails to differentiate between
compensated and uncompensated secondary obligors. In this
example, an uncompensated secondary obligor who had waived
suretyship defenses would have borne the full weight of the
$10,000 loss.
Consent may be given in advance, by general language
indicating that the secondary obligor waives all defenses based
on suretyship,87 or contemporaneously with the modification
of the underlying obligation.' Secondary obligors are general-
ly required to give up their defenses as part of the price for
entering into the suretyship agreement.' By failing to distin-
guish between classes of secondary obligors, and thus, allowing
indiscriminate waiver of suretyship defenses, the Restatement
furthers a regime in which uncompensated secondary obligors,
"typically have no protection whatsoever.'
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 39 Ills. 9, at 173.
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cat. d, at 210 ('There is
no requirement of specificity with respect to the language used to forego dis-
charge .... The secondary obligor need not waive separately each ground for
discharge, nor must the contract describe them.").
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. a, at 209.
See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043.
See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1043.
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III. CRITICISM OF THE RESTATEMENT: WAIVER OF SURETYSHIP
DEFENSES SHOULD BE PROHIBITED FOR REASONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY
A. An Argument for Extending a Special Solicitude to
Uncompensated Secondary Obligors
Waiver of the suretyship defenses of uncompensated sec-
ondary obligors should be prohibited as against public poli-
cy. 1 The examples from the preceding section illustrate how
suretyship defenses operate under the Restatement when such
defenses are not waived. 2 Recall, however, that in practice
there is "nearly uniform waiver of suretyship defenses. "
When suretyship defenses are waived, they have no legal ef-
fect.94 Thus, there is little difference between a Restatement
model of suretyship defenses which allows permissive waiver of
those defenses and a system in which suretyship defenses do
not exist.95
In light of the modern model of suretyship defenses which
the Restatement adopts, there is no longer any need for an
indiscriminate waiver doctrine. Recall that from early on, cred-
itors utilized waiver of suretyship defenses to protect them-
selves from automatic and total discharge of the secondary
obligation which flowed from alteration of the underlying obli-
gation.96 Complete discharge resulted whether the action tak-
" Secondary obligors who are in the business of entering into secondary obliga-
tions, receive a business benefit for entering into the secondary obligation, or are
otherwise induced to enter into the secondary obligation by separate consideration
that directly benefits the secondary obligor, are compensated secondary obligors.
That they are induced to assume the secondary obligation by receiving a benefit
justifies their receiving less tender treatment from the law. See RESTATEMENT OF
SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49(2)(a)(i), and Reporter's Note.
' In the above example, had suretyship defenses been waived, fianc6 would
have had to make the remaining car payments, even if buyer had been induced by
dealer not to perform. Fianc6 would not have been protected by the defenses
which the Restatement advocates.
9s Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042-43.
9 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042-43 (for the proposition that there is little
difference between a regime in which suretyship defenses are routinely waived and
one in which there are no suretyship defenses at all).
"6 Cohen supra note 9, at 1042; see also, Winston Corp. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 508 F.2d 1298, 1302 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that effects of traditional rule
were often harsh and unjust).
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en was harmful or beneficial to the secondary obligor,' the
modification was material or collateral,' or the secondary
obligor was compensated or uncompensated.' Those harsh
consequences no longer endure under existing law and practice
as advocated by the Restatement which relieves the secondary
obligor of its obligation to perform, but only to the extent that
the loss is caused by the creditor's actions,"° thus, mandat-
ing that creditors bear only the loss for which they are
responsible.1"'
Although such a result would be desirable," it is unlike-
ly that creditors would voluntarily refrain from utilizing waiv-
er clauses in suretyship contracts."°s Professor Neil. B. Cohen
has opined that secondary obligors would benefit from the
Restatement model if in fact, waiver became less preva-
lent.' Yet, the Restatement model of suretyship defenses
provides no incentive for creditors to stop using these provi-
sions0 5 and leaves them with type of unfettered discretion
that leads to continued abuse.' Indeed, there is little impe-
tus for the creditor to use care when modifying underlying obli-
gations.0 7 Simply put, the Restatement model fails to elimi-
nate the use. and abuse of provisions waiving the suretyship
defenses of uncompensated secondary obligors, a goal which
should be realized.
See Cohen supra note 9, at 1042.
See Cohen supra note 9, at 1042.
See Cohen supra note 9, at 1042. More recent models of suretyship defenses
have distinguished between compensated and uncompensated secondary obligors.
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49, Reporter's Note, at 217.
,'7 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1040.
101 RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, §§ 3942.
10 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1051 (speculating that waiver might become less
prevalent under the Restatement model).
1" Cohen, supra note 9, at 1051 (speculating that u[allthough it is unrealistic to
expect a widespread disappearance of waivers, such actions might become less
automatic under the Restatement model").
104 Cohen, supra note 9, at 1051.
10 See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48. (allowing permissive
use of waiver).
1 Utilization of waiver provisions renders creditors virtually los -proof. See
Cobien, supra note 9, at 1029.
107 The creditor does not suffer the loss caused from harmful modification of the
underlying obligation unless the secondary obligor is insolvent See Cohen, supra
note 9, at 1032.
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Because of the nature of the uncompensated obliga-
tion,l08 where secondary obligors' actions are gratuitous, cred-
itors should not be able to escape loss by utilizing waiver pro-
visions. Under the Restatement paradigm, the savvy obligee
will take unfair advantage of the gratuitous secondary obliga-
tion, granting releases and extensions of time and otherwise
modifying the terms of the underlying obligation when the
obligee stands to benefit from such action,0 9 but placing all
of the loss which its actions induce squarely upon the gratu-
itous secondary obligor. The Restatement allows the obligee to
gamble with the gratuitous secondary obligor's money at al-
most no risk to itself.
The following examples help to illuminate the issue. Sup-
pose that after the obligee extends the obligor additional time
to perform on the underlying obligation, the principal obligor's
ability to perform improves or remains the same. The creditor
receives an equivalent or greater performance of the underly-
ing obligation by the principal obligor plus a valuable consider-
ation for the extension. In such a case the creditor comes out
ahead, and the uncompensated secondary obligor is not
harmed. However, what happens if subsequent to granting an
extension the principal obligor's ability to perform deterio-
rates? The creditor retains the additional benefit obtained in
consideration for the extension and receives full performance of
the underlying obligation from the uncompensated secondary
obligor."' In both cases the creditor's gamble pays off equally
as well, because the performance which the creditor receives is
the same. However, in the latter situation, the gamble comes
"08 Professor Cohen points out that: "[uin these cases, the secondary obligor
receives no benefit from the transaction other than the satisfaction of having made
possible the principal obligor's obtaining credit that otherwise would have been un-
available." Cohen, supra note 9, at 1030.
'" See infra Part III.C.3. Creditors condition impairments of recourse upon the
receipt of a monetary benefit, such as additional interest. See ELDER, supra note
27, at 13941. Thus, the creditor does not grant an extension of time for perfor-
mance out of a generosity of spirit, but from a desire for profit. The creditor takes
advantage of the principal obligor's misfortune while insulating itself from loss--it
has insisted upon waiver of the gratuitous secondary obligor's suretyship defenses.
Releases, extensions, and other modifications of the underlying obligation are
known as "impairments of recourse." RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7,
§ 39 cmt. f, at 172.
110 Of course, this double benefit only exists where suretyship defenses have
been waived.
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at the expense of the gratuitous secondary obligor who is
bound by waiver to compensate the creditor for the injury the
creditor has inflicted upon the principal obligor. By allowing
permissive waiver, the Restatement has sanctioned a view of
suretyship defenses that creates an incentive for creditors to
seek modifications of underlying contractual obligations in
exchange for valuable consideration and with virtually no risk
of loss on the underlying contractual obligation.
A further illustration demonstrates just how pernicious
these results can be. Imagine a situation in which the principal
obligor's ability to perform deteriorates by exactly the amount
that the creditor has exacted as consideration for an extension.
Having already received payment of the sum as a valuable
consideration from the principal obligor, the creditor may then
demand payment of the identical ium from the gratuitous
secondary obligor."' Fundamental fairness and consumer
protection dictate that where a creditor impairs the recourse of
an uncompensated secondary obligor, and the ability of the
principal obligor to perform subsequently deteriorates, the
creditor, not the secondary obligator, should suffer the loss
caused by the deterioration in the principal obligor's ability to
perform.
Prohibiting waiver of suretyship defenses as applied to
uncompensated secondary obligors would protect their inter-
ests while recognizing that compensated secondary obligors are
not in need of similarly gentle treatment.'" Stated simply,
the policy supporting a special solicitude for secondary obligors
is not furthered when the secondary obligor receives compensa-
tion."
' The tender of a fee in consideration for an extension caused the principal
obligor to default on its performance of the underlying obligation by the amount of
the fee. Although the creditor caused the principal obligors ability to perform to
deteriorate, the creditor demanded full performance of the underlying obligation
from the waiver-bound gratuitous secondary obligor.
See Generally Monserud, supra note 30.
us See ELDER, supra note 27, at 90 (stating that the uncompensated secondary
obligor "acts without motives of pecuniary gain and hence should be protected
against 'unjuse pecuniary impoverishment," and that "the contract to which he
accedes is drawn by another party, or other parties."); and ELDER, supra note 27,
at 89 (explaining that corporate secondary obligors assume riskm in large num-
bers, for a pecuniary profit, and on an impersonal basis, through the medium of
standardized written contractual forms drawn by its own representatives with the
primary aim of protecting its own interests.); other compensated secondary
1997]
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A public policy proscribing such waiver would halt the
unfair and unjust practice whereby the obligee causes loss to
the uncompensated secondary obligor. Moreover, while enforc-
ing the modern approach to damages,"' such a policy would
establish an equitable balance between the rights of obligees
and uncompensated secondary obligors." 5 In this way, it is
possible to articulate the law's special solicitude for uncompen-
sated secondary obligors without bringing about harsh loss at
the expense of creditors.
obligors receive a business benefit, see RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7,
§ 49 cmt. b, at 214 (defining "business benefit" as a "benefit flowing from enhanc-
ing the credit of a customer or supplier, or of an enterprise of which the second-
ary obligor is an owner or officer."), or are induced by a consideration to enter
into the secondary obligation. See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 49
cmt. b, at 214 (stating that the consideration must be the inducement for assum-
ing the secondary obligation, and can be treated as having taken account of risk
in setting their prices).
.. The Restatement model of suretyship defenses puts "the innocent party in as
good a position as that party would have been in had the transgressor acted con-
sistently with its duty." See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1047-48.
.. The traditional model of suretyship defenses granted the uncompensated sec-
ondary obligor an absolute discharge of its duty to perform for any actions taken
to modify the underlying obligation; thus, many uncompensated secondary obligors
reaped windfalls at the expense of obligees. This lead to the routine use of waiver
clauses to protect obligees against harsh loss. But the almost exclusive use of
waiver clauses allowed obligees to take the same kinds of actions which the law
had previously deemed unfair, and in response to which the law developed surety-
ship defenses. The Restatement model of suretyship defenses mitigates the harsh-
ness of loss by discharging secondary obligors only to the extent of the harm
caused by creditors. This doctrine lacks the sting of the traditional suretyship
defenses; yet, in practice, it is hardly different than a model in which suretyship
defenses do not exist because the Restatement allows (imposed) waiver of those
defenses. A public policy prohibiting waiver in certain contexts would allow surety
ship defenses to take effect, thus, protecting the rights of uncompensated second-
ary obligors, while providing creditors with mechanisms for spreading loss. See
infra Part III.C. Thus, neither party should suffer the types of burdens which they
have suffered in the past.
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B. The Unconscionability of Clauses Waiving Suretyship
Defenses
1. Unconscionability Defined
Unconscionability is a term that is incapable of precise
definition. 6 A contract is unconscionable when it is, "so un-
fair as to 'shock the conscience of the court.' """ The com-
ments to the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") provide that
the, " "basic test is whether, in light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be uncon-
scionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.' ""s Notions of unconscionability are
often closely tied to "the unfairness of a particular clause in a
form contract.""9
Perhaps, however, notions of unconscionability have been
most closely associated with the absence of meaningful
choice.' 2 Professor Farnsworth defined procedural unconscio-
nability as: "broadly conceived to encompass not only the em-
ployment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and con-
voluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequali-
ty of bargaining power." " The use of adhesion contracts and
standardized agreements is not necessarily fatal where the
contract term lacks the element of surprise.' The doctrine of
unconscionability has most often been successfully invoked by
116 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 4.28, at 327 (1990).
117 Id. at 320; see also id. citing U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1984):
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
The doctrine of unconscionability has been applied to many non-sale of goods
transactions, either by analogy, or as an expression of a general doctrine.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 4.28, at 325.
118 FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, at 328 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt 1).
" FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, at 328 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, at 332 (designating what has come to be
known as procedural unconscionability).
FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, at 332-33.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, at 333-34.
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consumers.m
2. The Unconscionability of Waiver of the Suretyship
Defenses of the Uncompensated Secondary Obligor
Commentary to the Restatement recognizes that the rules
concerning unconscionability and good faith in fair dealing
place limits upon the parties' freedom to contract.2 4 The Re-
statement takes the position that waiver of discharge, based
upon consent to actions that would otherwise discharge the
secondary obligor, is not ordinarily unconscionable." Howev-
er, the Restatement commentary concludes that particular
consent or waiver provisions may be unconscionable."' 6 Un-
fair surprise and loss in contracts creating secondary obliga-
tions are most likely to be present where secondary obligors
are uncompensated.
Lenders are under no duty to disclose the existence or
explain the meaning of clauses waiving suretyship defens-
es, =7 and uncompensated secondary obligors generally do not
take the time to read them or comprehend their meaning."8
Accordingly, many uncompensated secondary obligors would be
surprised to learn of the effects of waiving suretyship defens-
es.'2 9 Nevertheless, uncompensated secondary obligors who
have unwittingly waived suretyship defenses will have those
waivers strictly enforced against them.'
In many cases, it would appear unconscionable to allow a
FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 4.28, at 330.
w RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. a, at 209.
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. a, at 209.
The Commentary States: "[wihether, however, a particular consent or waiver
violates those standards may depend on the content of the consent or waiver and
its context." RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. a, at 209.
1w RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 cmt. d, at 210-11. Specifi-
cally, "there is no duty of disclosure or explanation as to the legal effect of forego-
ing grounds for discharge."
' STEARNS, supra note 27, at 450 (stating that uncompensated secondary
obligors generally take no part in the writing of contracts and pay no attention to
the business of suretyship).
' See Agribank, FOB v. Whitlock, 621 N.E.2d 967, 976 (Ill. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).1 ) See RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b, at 218. ("The common
definition of waiver may lead to the incorrect inference that the promisor must
know his legal rights and must intend the legal effect of the promise.") (citation
omitted).
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commercial lender to rely upon convoluted or vague clauses,
contracts of adhesion, lack of equal bargaining power, and lack
of familiarity with contract terms in order to induce waiver by
an uncompensated secondary obligor."' Charging loss in-
curred through the use of such contracts to the gratutitous
secondary obligor violates the special solicitude that the law
has, throughout history, shown to such persons.'
Unless represented by legal counsel, it is unlikely that an
uncompensated secondary obligor would understand (or even
try to understand) provisions waiving various suretyship de-
fenses.' Pitfalls to comprehension exist whether the drafter
of a waiver clause employs specific terms or uses general lan-
guage. The use of general language obscures the significance of
consenting in advance to a release, extension of time, or other
' See FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 4.26, at 311-12. The following passages
from FARNSWORTH'S Contracts illustrate many of the dangers which are inherent
in commercial transactions:
Dangers are inherent in standardization... for it affords a means by
which one party may impose terms on another unwitting or even unwill-
ing party. Two circumstances facilitate this imposition. First, while the
party that proffers the form has the advantage of time and expert advice
in preparing it, the other party is usually completely or at least relative-
ly unfamiliar with its terms. That party may have no real opportunity to
read the form, and is often not expected to do so. The opportunity to
read it so may be diminished by the use of fine print and convoluted
clauses ... there may be no opportunity to bargain at all... (and) the
standard form may be used by an enterprise with such disproportionately
strong economic power that it simply dictates the terms ... [olr the
form may be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, often called a contract of
adhesion, under which the only alternative to complete adherence is out-
right rejection.
Id. at 312. "Karl Llewellyn attacked the traditional notion of assent as applied to
standard forms:"
Instead of thinking about 'assen to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has
in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the
broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing
more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable
or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 116, § 4.26, at 317 (citing KARL LLVTMILYN, THE COmI-
MON LAW TRADrION 370 (1960)). For a system of contracts based upon the theory
of bargain for exchange, assent to a contract of adhesion is often a hollow bargain
at best.
I This Note contends that charging creditor-induced loss to an uncompensated
secondary obliger is substantively unfair.
STEARNS, supra note 27, at 450.
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contractual modification of the underlying obligation."3 Yet,
the use of specific terms may do no more to engender a sense
of awareness of the nature and consequences of waiver."3 5
Additionally, gratuitous secondary obligors generally take
no part in the drafting of contracts."'6 Commercial lenders
employ contracts of adhesion, designed by experts, to maximize
the lender's benefit, 3 ' while uncompensated secondary
obligors generally have no familiarity with the contract terms
surrounding the secondary obligation.38 An uncompensated
secondary obligor who is unaware is more likely to be sur-
prised unfairly by the effects of a waiver provision and, conse-
quently, to suffer loss.'
Furthermore, it is substantively unfair to deprive the un-
compensated secondary obligor of suretyship defenses. Uncom-
pensated secondary obligors traditionally have been "favorites
of the law."'40 An authority on suretyship noted that as
'" But see RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 Reporter's Note, at
212 (stating that "the requirement that the language indicate that defenses are
being waived assures that a diligent indorser or accommodation party will, at the
least, not be unjustly surprised when it is asserted that the terms of the instru.
ment or agreement delete protections that would otherwise be available." (citing
U.C.C., PEB Commentary No. 11, at 1199 (1994))). However, the nature of the
uncompensated secondary obligation is such that uncompensated secondary obligors
generally do not prepare or take part in the preparation of contracts. STEARNS,
supra note 27, at 450-51. Thus, most uncompensated secondary obligors do not fit
the definition of the "diligent accommodation party" defined by the PEB Commen-
tary and cited by the Reporter's Note to the Restatement. Therefore, uncompen.
sated secondary obligors are likely to be unjustly surprised when it is asserted
that terms of the agreement delete suretyship defenses which would otherwise be
available.
1" RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 48 Reporter's Note, at 212
(stating that "[bly allowing the use of general language, the rule recognizes that
the use of lengthy provisions containing detailed waivers or even separate identifi-
cation of each ground for discharge does not necessarily promote greater under-
standing of an instrument's terms." (citing U.C.C., PEB Commentary No. 11, at
1199 (1994))).
ELDER, supra note 27, at 89.
See ELDER, supra note 27, at 89.
STEARNS, supra note 27, at 450.
See Agribank, 621 N.E.2d at 976 ("While many accommodation parties may
be surprised to learn the consent provisions in the instrument or accompanying
documents essentially preclude them from asserting suretyship defenses and render
little difference between their liability and the liability of the accommodated party,
such consent provisions . . . are routinely utilized by lenders.").
" See, e.g., Winston Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 508 F.2d 1298, 1302 (6th
Cir.), (stating that most jurisdictions differentiate between compensated and un-
compensated secondary obligors for the purpose of determining contractual liabili-
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courts were, "[slympathetically inclined toward the surety who
customarily received no benefit from the transaction, the
courts have been loath to apply the 'smarting.' "14 Professor
Elder described the rationale underlying the special status
given to uncompensated secondary obligors: "the early surety-
ship cases treated the contract as one of great burden to the
surety, because of the fact that it was usually made for accom-
modation only, and without any participation in the benefits of
the principal contract."' Accordingly, the law developed doc-
trines to protect the uncompensated secondary obligor against
unjust advantage taking' Creditors should not be able to
circumvent these historic doctrines of consumer protection and
enrich themselves in exactly the manner that the law has
otherwise proscribed.
Prohibiting waiver of the uncompensated secondary
obligor's suretyship defenses would greatly reduce unfair sur-
prise and enhance the uncompensated secondary obligor's
understanding of her legal rights and obligations. Moreover,
the prohibition of waiver would prevent loss which is substan-
tively unfair from falling upon gratuitous secondary obligors.
ty); Barber County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Walker, No. Civ. A. 87-2447-0, 1988 WL
139503, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 1988) (stating that Kansas courts have been very
protective of uncompensated sureties); In re Farmers' Co-op of Ark. and Okla.,
Inc., 43 B. 619, 623 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (reciting familiar proposition that uncom-
pensated secondary obligors are favorites of the law); Chandler v. Maxwell Manor
Nursing Home, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 740 (I. App. Ct. 1st Dist 5th Div. 1996). See
also ELDER, supra note 27, at 11 (Cthe [uncompensated) surety is a favorite of the
law .... ").
.. HAGENDORN, supra note 2, at 2. The concept was much misunderstood be-
cause the policy which created the special status for uncompensated secondary
obligors did not support the extension of a special status to compensated second-
ary obligors. To say that all secondary obligors are favorites of the law, would be
to ignore the distinction between compensated and uncompensated secondary
obligors. The rationale behind creating a special status for certain secondary
obligors only applies to uncompensated individuals.
2 ELDER, supra note 27, at 11-12. The favored status of uncompensated sec-
ondary obligors arose from the fact that they charge no premiums. Stearns, supra
note 27, at 450; RESTATEMENT OF SECURnT, supra note 29, at 234.
" The law also enforced provisions waiving suretyship defenses. However, at
that time, the remedy for modification of the underlying obligation was absolute
discharge of the secondary obligoer's duty to perform. The remedy for modification
of the underlying obligation is no longer automatic, complete discharge, but dis-
charge to the extent of the harm caused. As a matter of consumer protection, and
in light of the new model of suretyship defenses, the law should mandate that the
protections offered to uncompensated secondary obligers cannot be waived.
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That waiver clauses within such a context are susceptible to
unconscionability lends additional support to a public policy
argument for prohibiting waiver of a gratuitous secondary
obligor's suretyship defenses.
C. Side Effects of a Policy Enforcing Suretyship Defenses
A policy precluding the waiver of suretyship defenses in
transactions with uncompensated secondary obligors would
alter the way suretyship transactions are carried out. By pro-
hibiting waiver, every action taken by a creditor which caused
loss would result in a corresponding loss to that creditor. Cred-
itors might respond by charging initiation fees or higher inter-
est rates to offset this loss. They could also pursue the alterna-
tive route of taking no action to encourage payment of debts by
principal obligors, waiting instead until loans became due, and
then demanding payment in full from secondary obligors. It
might be argued that banks would have little incentive to
grant releases or extensions because such actions might ulti-
mately cause them loss, while the benefit of any actions that
improved the principal obligor's ability to perform would be
reaped by secondary obligors. Finally, this proposal would re-
strict the ability of autonomous actors to decide for themselves
whether to waive suretyship defenses.
1. Incentive to Enter into Contracts With Uncompensated
Secondary Obligors Where Suretyship Defenses are
Enforced
It might be argued that in a jurisdiction prohibiting waiv-
er of an uncompensated secondary obligor's suretyship defens-
es, creditors would lack the incentive to enter into contracts
creating this class of secondary obligations. The risk of suffer-
ing loss would discourage creditors from entering into such
contracts. Some principal obligors would then suffer because
creditors would not make loans to them, while creditors would
lose income which they currently collect on loans to riskier
principal obligors. Uncompensated secondary obligors would
suffer to the extent that they derive utility from assuming the
secondary obligation.
Contrary to these contentions, in a jurisdiction prohibiting
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such waiver, the lender would retain significant incentives th
enter into suretyship relationships. The lender still would have
two parties from whom to collect, and if the lender did nothing
to impair the recourse of the gratuitous secondary obligor, it
could collect in full from either obligor. This situation would
change only if the lender induced loss; yet, even if the lender
brought about loss, the uncompensated secondary obligor
would remain obligated to perform to the extent not dis-
charged.1' Recall that it is only where the lender's actions
have impacted adversely upon the principal obligor's ability to
perform that the secondary obligor will be relieved to any ex-
tent of its obligations.'"
More importantly, the creditor could offset loss by charging
somewhat higher interest rates and fees. Accordingly, the
creditor's incentive to enter into such transactions without
waiver of suretyship defenses would remain roughly equivalent
to the incentive to enter into them with waiver because loss
could be spread across the entire class of uncompensated sec-
ondary obligors, while the guarantee of performance would
remain available. Finally, where applicable, the creditor could
choose not to cause loss by choosing not to take the risk of
worsening the principal obligor's ability to perform when that
risk was too great.
2. Compensating for Loss By Charging Higher Fees
An arguable side effect of a policy prohibiting waiver is the
possibility that interest rates on suretyship transactions would
rise.' This would occur as banks incurred losses from the
operation of heretofore dormant suretyship defenses. This loss
would be charged to principal and secondary obligors in the
form of fees and higher interest rates. For example, assume
that a bank granted an extension for payment expecting that
1" See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 7, § 37, at 163-64. As long as
the creditor preserves the recourse of the secondary obligor as against the princi-
pal obligor, the secondary obligor will only be discharged from its obligation to the
extent of the harm caused by the creditor to the principal obligor's ability to per-
form.
14 See generally RESTATEMENT OF SUREThEHIP, supra note 7, §§ 39-42.
145 Note that higher interest rates and fees should accrue only where creditors
have continued to risk causing loss.
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the principal obligor would get a great job in six month's time
upon earning a law degree. Unfortunately, the principal obligor
fails the bar. 47 The bank guessed wrong. In that time, the
principal obligor's ability to perform deteriorates by $5000, and
suretyship defenses operate to place this loss upon the bank.
The bank will pass the loss off to principal and secondary
obligors in the form of higher interest rates and fees. For every
dollar lost, the bank will seek to gain at least an equivalent
amount.
Some secondary obligors may not like having to compen-
sate for this loss in the form of higher fees, and a policy pro-
hibiting consumers from waiving their suretyship defenses is a
limitation on the freedom of those individuals to contract-
individuals who might prefer to take the risk of suffering a
large loss rather than pay modest fees. Nonetheless, the free-
dom of uncompensated secondary obligors to contract should be
limited as a matter of consumer protection.'
Limiting the ability of consumers to waive suretyship
defenses protects the uninformed consumer from waiving valu-
able protections while encouraging creditors to spread loss.
This prevents heavy burdens from falling on such individuals.
A policy decision in favor of loss spreading (and prohibiting
147 Example verbally transmitted by Professor Neil B. Cohen.
14 "Beginning in the 1970s, a flurry of legislation at the state and federal lev-
es was enacted to protect the consumer ... it is clear that nowadays the law
perceives the equality gap between the provider of goods, money or credit on one
hand, and the acquirer of these amenities on the other hand, and tries to step in
to fill that gap." TANG THANH TRAI LE, PROTECTING CONSUMER RIGHTS § 102, at 3
(1987) (emphasis added). Most states have enacted usury laws proscribing the
imposition of interest above a predetermined limit. Id. at 142. At least 45 states
have enacted statutes limiting or precluding the use of "waiver-of-defense" clauses
in consumer transactions. These clauses generally provide that "defenses available
against the seller cannot be used against the seller's assignee, the finance compa-
ny." HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES
AND CREDIT REGULATION § 596, at 316 (1986); see also Edward J. Murphy, Anoth.
er 'Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of.
Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667 (1968), reprinted in
CONSUMER PROTECTION: A SYMPOSIUM (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972). Finally, the
1974 version of the Uniform Commercial Credit Code "flatly prohibits agreements
to limit or waive the claims or defenses of a consumer." ALPERIN & CHASE, § 596,
at 324-25. The preceding examples only are intended to be illustrative of the types
of areas in which state and federal governments have enacted statutes limiting the
freedom of parties to contract away consumer protections, and not as an exhaus-
tive list.
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waiver) postulates that the autonomy of a small minority of
consumers must be subjugated in order to protect the autono-
my of consumers in general.
3. Incentives to Collect From Principal Obligors
It may be argued that under a policy prohibiting waiver of
the suretyship defenses of gratuitous secondary obligors, credi-
tors will have no incentive to collect from principal obligors.
Instead, they will wait until due dates arrive and demand full
performance from secondary obligors."' The likelihood that
secondary obligors will be asked to perform will increase dra-
matically. The extent of such performance will also increase, as
creditors will make no efforts to extract performance from
principal obligors. Secondary obligors will be burdened with
the job of collecting from principal obligors in subrogation to
the rights of creditors. Simply put, implementation of such a
policy would make it more likely that uncompensated second-
ary obligors would be asked to perform and then be forced to
collect from principal obligors. For example, on the date that
the loan for the same law student (as discussed above) becomes
due, the creditor will not grant an extension of time to that
student because the risk of the student not passing the bar is
too great to justify the extension. Instead, the creditor will go
straight to the secondary obligor for full performance.
This line of argumentation fails to appreciate that there
remains a strong incentive for creditors to continue to grant re-
leases and extensions of the time for performance. Creditors
who grant extensions of time or alter the terms of a contract
are not driven by compassion but by profit. A creditor who opts
to grant a six month extension can collect six month's worth of
additional interest.' Such a creditor might condition the ex-
1" Note that if creditors opted to collect directly from secondary obligors with-
out first pursuing principal obligors for payment (including granting extensions and
releases), there would be no need to charge higher interest rates and fees, because
creditors would not suffer any loss.
" See ELDER, supra note 27, at 140-41 (discussing the conditioning of an ex-
tension in the time for performance by principal obligor upon the payment of in-
terest).
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tension of time on the payment of a consideration-payment of
advance interest, a higher interest rate,151 or other fee. 52
Thus, considerable incentives remain for creditors to grant
extensions.
It may be asked if these incentives would be weighty
enough to overcome the danger of suffering loss caused by
discharge of secondary obligations. A creditor could spread
potential losses across the entire pool of obligors, minimizing
the risk of loss to itself, by charging additional fees and inter-
est dollars to offset individual losses. Such a creditor would
have the same motivation, in the form of consideration, to
grant releases and extensions as a creditor functioning under
the Restatement model, and accordingly, would be no more
likely to call for performance by a secondary obligor on a due
date than would a Restatement model creditor. Thus, it is
unlikely that a creditor would choose to forego the possibility
of earning additional income where suretyship defenses are in
effect any more than a creditor would choose to do so where
those defenses have been waived.
4. The Well Informed Uncompensated Secondary Obligor
This proposal would bar informed uncompensated second-
ary obligors from waiving their suretyship defenses (in inter-
ference with the freedom of contract).' An informed uncom-
pensated secondary obligor might prefer to gamble away sure-
tyship defenses in exchange for better contract terms, such as
a lower interest rate. For example, Acme Bank, a creditor,
. See ELDER, supra note 27, at 140-41 (discussing higher rate of interest in
terms of consideration for modification of underlying obligation).
... See ELDER, supra note 27, at 139 (stating that payment of interest may be
made in advance of due date). It is conceivable that creditors might also condition
extensions upon other consideration.
" See Hamish Stewart, Where is the Freedom in Freedom of Contract? A Com-
ment on Trebilcock's The Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
259, 260-61 (1995). Hamish Stewart defines the freedom of contract as "both al-
lowing individuals to make their own decisions about what agreements to enter
into and enforcing strictly those agreements-in private ordering." Id. at 260 (con-
cluding that freedom of choice is presupposed by doctrines of contract law in that
"those doctrines treat the contracting parties as autonomous agents who are free
and equal in the sense that they have an abstract capacity to enter into con-
tracts.").
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rate of 8.5% if Jane agrees to guarantee the loan. However, if
Acme gives Jane a choice between guaranteeing the loan at
8.5% interest and keeping her suretyship defenses, or waiving
her suretyship defenses in exchange for a lower interest rate of
7%, should Jane, who is a gratuitous secondary obligor, be
permitted to waive her suretyship defenses?
There are several reasons why Jane should not be permit-
ted to waive her defenses.' In the first place, it is unlikely
that a creditor would offer her such a choice. The creditor does
not need to bargain for waiver of suretyship defenses which
are routinely waived in suretyship contracts.' It is no secret
that informed uncompensated secondary obligors are uncom-
mon; put simply, there is only a slim possibility that an in-
formed secondary obligor would be offered a contractual choice.
For most consumers, placing a prohibition on the freedom to
waive suretyship defenses would not restrict any freedom of
which the consumer was ever aware or would ever have had
an opportunity to exercise. Assuming, however, that an uncom-
pensated secondary obligor was offered a choice, and assuming
that he or she was informed about suretyship defenses, the
uncompensated secondary obligor should not be permitted to
waive its suretyship defenses.5
This policy protects the great majority of gratuitous sec-
ondary obligors who assume secondary obligations out of
friendship 7 and who are not informed about suretyship de-
fenses.' It also prevents creditors from taking advantage of
1 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law In The Welfare State: A Defense Of The
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, And Related Limitations On The Freedom
To Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 283 (1995). 'Conventional theories of contract
law" which emphasize freedom to contract 'do not satisfactorily account for laws
that restrict contractual freedom, such as usury laws, the unconadonability and
related doctrines, and certain bankruptcy laws." Id. Such laws, and many others
already in place, limit an actor's freedom to contract.
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042.
* The gratuitous actor who would choose to waive his or her defenses should
be precluded from doing so. Cf. Posner, supra note 155, at 285, 307 (stating that,
"The nonwaivable right to discharge in bankruptcy prevents debtors from pledging
future assets as collateral... [Although] [tihe debtor might be willing to waive in
advance his [or her] right to discharge in bankruptcy in order to obtain a lower
interest rate ... the law prohibits such a waiver.).
Cohen, supra note 9, at 1042; WILLISTON, supra note 23, at 3488.
Uninformed uncompensated secondary obligors should not be held legally
liable for waiving suretyship defenses. See Bailey EL Kuldin, The Asymmietrical
Conditions of Legal Responsibility In The Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L, REV. 893
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unwitting secondary obligors, and it precludes from arising the
situation where an uncompensated secondary obligor is forced
to choose between waiving its suretyship defenses and guaran-
tying a loan with an exorbitant interest rate. Like other laws
which have been enacted to protect consumers, this policy
restricts the autonomy of individuals for the benefit of the
group'
59
CONCLUSION
Unlike the traditional approach to suretyship defenses, the
Restatement model protects creditors against harsh, automatic,
complete discharge of the secondary obligation. The Restate-
ment adopts a modern damages model of suretyship defenses,
discharging secondary obligors only to the extent of the harm
caused, but allows permissive waiver of those defenses. Al-
though the Restatement fails to protect them from creditor-
generated loss, uncompensated secondary obligors should be
protected. The uncompensated secondary obligation is a gratu-
itous obligation, and the uncompensated secondary obligor
generally takes no part in drawing up the contract and does
not investigate the risk that the principal obligor will not per-
form. Moreover, the enforcement of suretyship defenses would
not be an obstacle to the creation of secondary obligations
because creditors have ample incentives to continue entering
into such agreements and have the ability to offset risk and
spread loss. This proposal establishes a close balance between
(1990). For the uninformed, "[1]egal liability is limited . .. because they are not in
a posture to obtain or process [information]." Id. at 938.
.. See Joseph R. Grodin, Contract, Tort, And Individual Responsibility: An Ana-
lytic Framework, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1040, 1041 (1992). Professor Grodin enumer-
ated a number of common limitations on the freedom to contract in daily consum-
er life:
We cannot contract to sell ourselves into slavery.. . . Legislatively im.
posed wage and hour laws exist. We also have worker's compensation,
which overrides the terms of any contrary agreement ..... Title VII,
with its limitations upon contract, promotes nondiscrimination principles.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act tells us that, as a matter of
public policy, questions of safety will not be left entirely to the market-
place ... [and] a contract cannot determine when an employer may
insist upon giving employees a polygraph test or when that employer
may rely upon such tests as a basis for dismissal.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the rights of obligees and uncompensated secondary obligors,
while eliminating unfair loss and surprise.
Brett E. Lewis

